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INCENTIVES, REPUTATION, AND THE GLORIOUS
DETERMINANTS OFJUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Gerald N. Rosenberg*
How do judges reach decisions? For the lawyer, there is a simple and
straightforward answer; judges apply precedent, reason by analogy, and
reach a decision thai if not compelled by this legal method, is strongly
indicated by it. In contrast, for political scientists who study judicial
decision-making, there is a different but equally straightforward answer;
judges select an outcome that is closest to their preferred policy
preferences and. then make use of precedent and legal reasoning to
justify it.' For many political scientists, the legal method is a
smokescreen for disguising the policy preferences ofjudges. For many
lawyers and legal academics, this political science "attitudinal model"
misunderstands whatjudges actually do and politicizes courts. Into this
debate steps Frederick Schauer.
Professor Schauer investigates what influences judges to reach the
decisions they make. Rather than taking sides in the debate, he
canvasses the legal and political science literature and finds it wanting
because it overlooks yet another potential motivating factor in judicial
decision-making; personal ambition and self-interest. As Professor
Schauer puts it, "ifjudges are human beings who have an array of self-
interested motivations to accompany their public-interested motivations,
then it is important that not only political scientists, but also lawyers, law
students, and all the rest of us who study the courts ought to understand
these motivations."2  In contrast to the study of elected officials,
Professor Schauer notes that "there has been virtually no systematic
empirical inquiry into judicial ambition or self-interested judicial
motivation."' In the preceding article, he lays out the argument for
studying the personal ambition and self-interest ofjudges as a motivating
factor injudicial decision-making and discusses the pitfalls and opportu-
nities it presents.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. SeeJeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Voes of US. Supreme Courtj ustices,
83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Jausices Revisited, 57J. POL 812 (1995) [hereinafter ldeological Valus wisited]; JEFFREY A. SECAL& HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrruDINAL MODEL (1993). For an argument thatjudges
must act strategically rather than vote their sincere policy preferences, see LEE EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICESJUSTICES MAKE (1998).
2. Frederick Schauer, Incenies, Reputation, and the Inglorious Deteminants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U.
CINN. L REV. 615, 617-18 (footnotes omitted).
3. Id. at 621.
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In the material that follows, I will talk about the strengths of this
article, raise questions about some of its analysis, and suggest that if we
are to studyjudicial self-interest and ambition, we should take a different
approach than Professor Schauer recommends.
I. EMPIRICAL STRENGTHS
A discussant, and a commentator, is only as good as the paper he is
asked to discuss. In this case, I am very fortunate because as an
empirical political scientist I take my hat off to Professor Schauer.
Unlike virtually any other legal academic, he not only cites empirical
social science, but he also reads it!4 And he reads it intelligently!
Throughout his analysis, Professor Schauer stresses the empirical nature
of law and courts. For example, in making the case for the visibility of
Supreme Court Justices, he compiles and presents data on press
references to Justices Sherman Minton and Stanely Reed, federal circuit
court judge Henry Friendly, California Supreme CourtJustice Roger
Traynor, and Illinois Supreme CourtJustice Walter Schaeffer.5 It's a
small point, but Professor Schauer's attention to empirical evidence is
noteworthy.
In general, legal academics excel at doctrinal analysis, jurisprudence
and legal theory, but often forget they are dealing with real human
beings situated in a particular historical, political, social and cultural
setting. In contrast, Professor Schauer emphasizes the necessity of
empirical investigation for questions and arguments about the real
world. In thinking about what motivates judges, Schauer emphasizes
the necessity of empirical work. As he puts it, "the question of how
many judges within a given system actually have the internal point of
view in the Hartian sense is not a question than can be answered with
philosophical-as opposed to empirical-tools."6 Professor Schauer's
insistence on the importance of empirical work is to be praised.
4. For a critique of legal academic scholarship for ignoring social science, see Gerald N. Rosenberg,
Across the Great Divide (Between law and Political Science), 3 GREEN BAG 267 (2d ed. 2000).
5. See id. at 618.
6. Id. at 635.
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II. WHY SHOULD WE EXPECT THE STUDY OFJUDICIAL
MOTIVATIONS TO PAY OFF?
As important as empirical investigation is to understanding the way
courts and judges actually work, would one advise a young social
scientist or legal academic or law review note writer to study the role of
personal ambition and self-interest in judicial decision-making?
Professor Schauer suggests yes. He notes correctly that political
scientists who study judicial decision-making from a variety of theoreti-
cal perspectives have ignored "the possibility that judges, no less than
legislators and bureaucrats, have strong career-based self-interests that
often inform or dominate their policy preferences."7 But there may be
good reasons for this. In general, the settings are very different. Judges,
in contrast to elected officials, operate with a set of institutional and
cultural constraints that strongly mitigate against personal ambition and
self-interest. In particular, a judge who justified an opinion, either
publicly or on the cocktail circuit, on the ground that he was hoping to
be elevated to a higher court, or on the ground that it would make him
famous or popular with some group, would surely be criticized if not
investigated for violating his judicial oath. It.is also the case, as I will
explore below, that many more factors go intojudicial nominations than
prior opinions. In contrast, elected officials routinely justify public
positions on the ground that they are running for higher office, orjustify
votes as payoffs to interest groups. These differences mean that scholars
investigating judicial self-interest need to explore very carefully the
options and tools with which judges work.
Specifically, investigating the role of personal ambition and self-
interest injudicial decision-making is extremely hard to do. As Professor
Schauer notes, judges are unlikely to talk candidly about their motiva-
tions.8 In contrast, elected officials will and do. Indeed, elected
politicians often take positions to help certain key constituencies, take
credit for certain outcomes, position themselves on the issues, etc.9 And
they love to talk! The constraints on judges not only may explain why
the influence of personal ambition and self-interest in judicial decision-
making has not been investigated, but also why it is inadvisable to try to
do so.
As a final point, it is worth remembering that understanding and
studying the factors that influence judicial decision-making is only one
7. Id. at 620.
8. See id. at 623.
9. For the classic theoretical exposition of this position, see DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
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way of studying law and courts, and perhaps not the most important
way. 0 There remain a whole host of other theoretically and empirically
important questions about what judges and courts do and how they
interact with the society in which they operate. These range from the
impact ofjudicial outputs to the role of interests groups and the public
to the influence of other branches, and so forth. That being said, there
is a literature on judicial decision-making and it does not investigate
judicial ambition and self-interest.
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT?
Having made the case for the lack of work on the role of personal
ambition and self-interest injudicial decision-making, Professor Schauer
then makes a curious move; he suggests that studies focus on the U.S.
Supreme Court." I describe the move as curious because Supreme
Court Justices are particularly poorly situated, both empirically and
theoretically, for such an inquiry. Empirically, it seems safe to state that
Supreme CourtJustices will not respond to questions about the role of
personal ambition and self-interest in their decisions. Surely, the
concern that greeted the publication of two books purporting to offer an
inside view of the Supreme Court is testimony to the unwillingness of
Justices to publicly explore their motivations for decisions. 2 Further, as
Professor Schauer points out later, Justices rarely move on to other
positions. Justice ArthurJ. Goldberg did leave the Court in 1965 to
serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, but reportedly did so
only at the behest of President LyndonJohnson. Justice Charles Evans
Hughes resigned in 1916, but he did so to run against Woodrow Wilson
for the presidency as the nominee of the Republican and Progressive
parties, losing by a mere twenty-three electoral votes. More recently,
there were persistent rumors that Justice Douglas was interested in
running for President or Vice-President, and similar rumors about
Justice O'Connor, but neither have left the bench. These few cases
aside, serving as a Supreme Court Justice is not a stepping stone to
greater glory.
10. This is true ofdecision-making in other institutions as well.
11. Professor Schauer suggests studying Supreme Court Justices because their "visibility could
plausibly create a set of motivations sharply distinguishing Supreme CourtJustices from all other members
of the judiciary." Schauer, supra note 2, at 618.
12. See BOB WOODWARD &ScoTARMsTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDETHE SUPREME COURT
(1979); EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998).
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It is also the case that promotions from Associate Justice to Chief
Justice are rare. In the entire history of the U.S. Supreme Court, only
three sitting Associate Justices have been elevated to Chief Justice;
Edward White, Harlan Fiske Stone, and William Rehnquist. In
addition, two others who served as ChiefJustice had been previously
appointed Associate Justices; John Rutledge" and Charles Evans
Hughes. Given that over one hundred people have sat on the U.S.
Supreme Court, the chances of being elevated to ChiefJustice are slight.
This reinforces the point that the U.S. Supreme Court is not a particu-
larly rich site for study of the role of personal ambition and self-interest
in judicial decision-making. Professor Schauer suggests a way around
this--reputation--and I will return to it shortly.
IV. LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS: A BETTER
BUT STILL PROBLEMATIC RESEARCH SITE
Lower federal court and state court judges may provide a better
research site for two reasons. First, they do get promoted. For example,
eight of the nine current justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (all but
ChiefJustice Rehnquist) served as judges prior to their Supreme Court
appointment. Second, lower federal court and state court judges do
leave the bench, often at ages young enough to allow pursuit of other
career interests. In order to illustrate this point, I gathered some
preliminary tenure data on twenty randomly selected federal district
court appointees of Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush.' 4 They are
presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
President Av. Age # Resigned/ Av. Length of Service
at Commission Retired of Resigned/
RetiredJudges
Carter 48 13 16.4 years
Reagan 48 7 14 years
Bush 48 2 8.4 years
13. Rutledge was appointed by President Washington as one of the original associatejustices of the
Supreme Court, but resigned without ever deciding a case. In 1795 he was appointed ChiefJustice and
served for four months before the Senate rejected the nomination. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall ed.) (1992).
14. I thank Christopher Rohrbacher for his help in gathering the data.
2000)
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Table 1 suggests that at least some federal district court judges are
leaving the bench at relatively young ages. For example, thirteen of the
twenty federal district courtjudges appointed by President Carter in the
random sample have left the bench, having served an average of 16.4
years. Since the average age of appointment was forty-eight, this
suggests that thesejudges were likely in their mid-sixties, certainly young
enough for further work. Among the twenty federal district courtjudges
appointed by President Reagan in the random sample, seven have left
the bench, having served an average of fourteen years. Since the
average age of appointment for the Reagan appointees in the sample
was also forty-eight, this suggests that these judges, like those appointed
by President Carter, were likely in their mid-sixties, again young enough
for further work. On the state level, judges do not have life tenure and
there is some turnover, often from electoral defeat (or lack of retention).
What these data suggest is that below the Supreme Court judges do
leave the bench, opening up the possibility that ambition and self-
interest can play a role in their decision-making.
These data suggest that lower federal court and state court judges
provide a more promising avenue for research into the role of ambition
and self-interest in judicial decision-making. In addition, they might be
willing to talk to researchers for three reasons. First, their greater
numbers may provide anonymity. That is, if one were to interview
federal and state judges who resign or retire, and state judges who lose
elections, they would be less readily identifiable than U.S. Supreme
CourtJustices, even with a guarantee of anonymity. One could refer to
them as a federal judge or a state judge without referring to their court,
geographic location, or level in the judicial hierarchy. Second, since
they would no longer be sitting judges, they might feel less constrained
in speaking to researchers than judges in active service. Third, because
on the state level elections are public,judges who lose elections might be
willing to talk about what they did in trying to retain their judgeships.
Although lower federal court and state court judges appear to offer a
more promising site than U.S. Supreme CourtJustices for research into
the role of personal ambition and self-interest in judicial decision-
making, even here there is a caveat; the practice of the judicial selection
process. Professor Schauer notes that "it would be worth examining
what forms of judicial behavior appear to produce the greatest likeli-
hood of the desired reward" and then asks, "[w] ould a federal district
courtjudge who wanted to become a court of appealsjudge decide cases
in one way rather than another?"' 5 As a matter of logic, this seems
15. Schauer, supra note 2, at 632.
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unlikely. On the federal level, it requires prodigious powers of predic-
tion about who will be President, what vacancies will occur, what issues
will be important, and so forth. Also; it puts far too much weight on
judicial decisions as key determinants of career advancement. The
literature onjudicial selection is clear on two points: potential nominees
must belong to the same political party as the president; and potential
nomineesmust win the support of the Senators of the president's party
from the state in which the vacancy they seek is located.
There is a practice in the U.S. Senate known as "Senatorial Cour-
tesy." in the flowery language of the Senate of an earlier time, Harold
Chase explains it this way: "senators will give serious consideration to
and be favorably disposed to support an individual senator of the
president's party who opposes a nominee to an office in his [or her]
state."' 6 Put more bluntly in 1997 by Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, "the policy is that if a senator returns a
negative blue slip, that person's gonna be dead."" In practice this
means that federal district court appointees need the support of the
Senators of the President's party from the state in which the court sits.
With the federal circuit courts there is a tradition of state representation,
with seats being earmarked as being held by judges from particular
states within the circuit. Thus, circuit court appointees need the support
of the Senators of the President's party from the state for which the
vacancy is earmarked. The practice of senatorial courtesy is deeply
entrenched and may even have jumped across party lines so that
opposition from a Senator from the Senate's majority party to an
appointment in his or her state may derail a presidential judicial
nomination regardless of the party of the President."' In practice, then,
befriending your Senators is a good deal more important in winning a
federal court nomination than crafting ajudicial opinion in a particular
way.
The key role of political preferences and party activism in judicial
appointees can be seen by examining the background of federal court
judges. On average, approximately 90% offederal court appointees are
members of the same political party as the President who appoints them.
.or example, 91.7% of President Reagan's federal district court
appointees were Republicans, as were 88.5% of President Bush's. To
16. HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERALJUDGEs: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972).
17. Interview by Nina Totenberg for NPR with Orrin Hatch (Sept. 24, 1997).
18. For recent examples, see Sheldon Goldman, Bush's judicial Lgacy: The Final Imprint, 76
JUDICATURE 287, 288-90 (1993); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiis: Many
Bridges to Cross, 80JUDICATURE 254, 262-66 (1997); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Pickingjudges
Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 268-72 (1999) [hereinafter Picking]. See generatly SHELDON GOLDMAN,
PICKING FEDERALJUDGEs: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
2000] 643
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date, 89.10% of President Clinton's federal district court appointees have
been -Democrats. 9 With the federal circuit courts, a full 9 6 .2% of
President Reagan's appointees were Republicans, a percentage of same-
party affiliation that dropped only to 85.4% with President Clinton.2"
As for party activism, on the whole federal court judges were politically
active in their pre-judicial careers. For example, under Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy, 80% of federal circuit court appointees were
political activists in their pre-judicial careers.2 In more recent times,
more than half have been so. Under President Bush, 5 8 .8% of federal
district court appointees were Republican Party activists, as were 6 4 .8 %
of federal circuit court appointees.22 Although President Clinton has the
lowest percentages in recent history of party activists among his federal
court appointees, more than half have been Democratic Party activists
in their pre-judicial careers. About 62% of Clinton's federal district
court appointees have been Democratic Party activists, as have been
81.3% of his federal circuit court appointees.23 Thus, being a party
activist in the party of the President in one's pre-judicial career appears
to be a powerful factor in winning a federal court nomination. There
is nothing a sitting judge who seeks a federal court appointment or
promotion can do to influence this.
It is the case that those seeking federal court appointments or
promotions can, and do, campaign and lobby for them. For example,
Professor Sheldon Goldman found that about 40% of the files on
President Eisenhower and Kennedy's federal court appointees contained
letters of recommendation for candidates from otherjudges.24 Granted,
the extent to which sitting federal judges understand the political
underpinnings of the appointment system is an empirical question, it is
reasonable to assume that since federal judges were nominated at least
once, they understand how the system works. The point is simple:
examination ofjudicial ambition and self-interest must be informed by
the empirical literature and actual practice.
19. SeePiddn, supra note 18, at 275.
20. See id at 280.
21. &e Sheldon Goldman, )JSdicid Appointbws to a e United Stater Courts of Appeals, in AMERICAN
COURT SYSTEMS 273 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat cds., 1978).
22. Se PAi supra note 18, at 275, 280.
23. See id.
24. Se Goldman, nupra note 21, at 27!.
644,
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V. REPUTATION
In order, perhaps, to avoid some of these difficulties, Professor
Schauer suggests another goal for ambitious and self-interested judges:
reputation.25 He urges, in effect, that scholars explore the extent to
which U.S. Supreme CourtJustices reach decisions and write opinions
with an eye toward enhancing their reputations. While this avoids the
difficulties with promotions and other careers outlined above, it creates
another set of difficulties. The key question that a focus on reputation
presents is this: Reputation Mhen, with Whom, about What?
The When question can be divided into two time periods, the short-
term present and the long-term historical. Ifjustices are interested in
enhancing their historical reputation over time, after they have left the
bench and, perhaps, have died, their cause is hopeless. It is impossible
to predict the future with any accuracy. Consider, for example, some
celebrated dissenting opinions such as those ofJustice Harlan in Plessy26
and the Civil Rights Cases27 andJustice Holmes in Lochner,28 Abrams 9and
Gitlow.3° These were not celebrated as great dissents when written.3'
They only became so when political views changed. In other words, a
Justice seeking to enhance his historical reputation has no way of
knowing which of his opinions will be considered great, enhancing his
reputation, and which will be relegated to the dustbin of history.
Historical reputation seems an unlikely motivating factor for justices.
Professor Schauer seems to suggest that justices seek short-term
reputational enhancement, and with a particular group:
Justices appear to have a desire to conform their attitudes to the
attitudes of the social and professional circles in which they travel, and
thus'to the attitudes of the intellectual elite in general, and to the
attitudes of law professors at elite institutions in particular.3 2
Who are these elites more specifically? Professor Schauer writes that the
"primary creators of reputation for Supreme CourtJustices' ' 33 are:
25. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 627.
26. S&e Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
28. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
30. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
31. For an examination of the creation of canonical dissents, see Richard A. Primus, Canon,
Anti-Canon, andjudka/Dissnt, 48 DuKE LJ. 243 (1998).
32. Schauer, supra note 2, at 628.
33. Id. at 629.
20001
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the mainstream elite press, elite law professors writing law review
articles and other forms of legal scholarship, law professors teaching
classes in law schools in which various Justices are described in
flattering or non-flattering terms, editors of law school casebooks, law
students at elite law schools writing law review notes, and historians,
including but not limited to the historians who write judicial biogra-
phies.34
The difficulty here is that the views of these elites are amorphous and
unpredictable. Professor Schauer assumes that these attitudes are
consensual rather than conflictual. While one might be able to predict
the way a Ronald Dworkin or a Richard Posner will react to a particular
opinion, there are a variety of opinions among the elites to whom
Professor Schauer points. This means that a justice cannot know with
much certainty how an opinion will be more generally received
Enhancing one's reputation in the short-term with the "primary creators
of reputation for Supreme Court Justices" is not as straightforward as
first appears.
There is also an important question of disentangling reputation as a
motivating factor from shared understandings. Consider, for example,
Justice Scalia and assume he writes an opinion that is highly praised by
conservative academics,journalists, and intellectual elites. It is logically
possible that he wrote the opinion to win their approval and enhance his
reputation among them. However, it is also logically possible that he
wrote the opinion because it represents his sincere judicial views. The
fact that the opinion wins praise from conservative groups may not be
because Justice Scalia desired to enhance his reputation with them but
rather because both he and they share a similar world view. Thus, an
opinion that might appear to be the result of reputation-enhancing
motivation might have nothing to do with reputation at all.
Complicated though the reputation game may be, Professor Schauer
suggests that the political effect of justices'seeking to enhance their
reputation with intellectual elites is to move them politically to the left.
This occurs because many of the leading elites who Professor Schauer
suggests can enhance reputation are on the political left, and because
the Supreme Court "exists as an institution of rights protection and with
a consequent internal culture of rights protection."35 "Mt is plausible
to conclude," he writes, "that six-Justices Blackmun, Powell, Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-have moved to the left.., in the
policy attitudes that, according to the ideological or attitudinal model of
34. Id. at 629.
35. Id. at 627.
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judicial decision-making, would predict their judgments."36 There are
three problems with this analysis.
First, the notion of a left-right continuum on which the claim is based
is theoretically problematic.37 It is no longer clear, if it ever was, what
it means to be on the left or right of a whole host of issues. For example,
is opposition to pornography a conservative right-wing position or a
liberal, feminist, left-wing position? Is supporting the family a conserva-
tive right-wing position based on notions of patriarchy and religious
fundamentalism or a left-wing position based on notions of caring and
helping the vulnerable? The left-right claim would be more useful if it
specified the issues and the positions that justices were pushed to adopt.
Second, the notion of rights protection as a left-wing attribute is also
problematic. There are rights on both sides of the political spectrum.
A commitment to rights protection can have deeply conservative
outcomes by protecting, for example, the right to private property at the
expense of a claimed public need. Again, Professor Schauer is aware of
this difficulty, 8 but he gives it little attention.
Third, Professor Schauer's claim that the logic of reputation-
enhancement pushes justices to the left is not supported by empirical
social science. In a seminal article, Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover
examined how justices' perceived ideology correlates with their votes.39
In searching for a measure of the justices' ideology independent of their
Supreme Court votes, Segal and Cover analyzed and coded editorials
written at the time of nomination in the New rork Times, the Washington
Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Chicago Tribune for all Supreme Court
nominees from ChiefJustice Warren to Justice Kennedy. They found
a high level of correlation between the ideological values of the justices
and their votes in civil liberties cases.4" In particular, contrary to
Professor Schauer's claim, they find that the votes ofJustices Powell,
Kennedy, and O'Connor are quite accurately predicted.4 Overall,
while they did find that nine justices voted in a more liberal direction
than predicted, they also found that eight justices voted in a more
conservative direction than predicted. The point is that social science
literature does not support Professor Schauer's intuition that the logic of
reputation-enhancement pushes justices to the left.
36. Id. at 625-26 (footnotes omitted).
37. Professor Schauer admits this but dismisses its importance.
38. Seeid
39. See Segal & Cover, supra note 1.
40. See Segal & Cover, supra note 1, at 561.
41. In an article updated to includejustice Souter, the authors found that "the predicted result for
Souter in civil liberties (43.2) is quite close to his actual score of 47.6," and that with economic cases, the
prediction was "within one point for Souter." Ideologial Values Reviite4 supra note I, at 818.
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On a related point, Professor Schauer suggests that reputation-
enhancement seeking justices are more likely to be outcome-oriented in
modern times than in the past because today "judicial craft is far less
important to these esteem-granting groups, and sympathy with the
outcome is far more important."42 This claim romanticizes and glorifies
the past and belies both when and where Professor Schauer went to law
school. I suspect that the only thing that has changed is the openness
with which esteem-granting groups admit to being outcome oriented.
Surely Chief'Justice Marshall played fast and loose with constitutional
and statutory language in cases like Marbuy,43 but this hasn't prevented
him from being considered among the greatest Chief Justices. The
Harvard Law School where Professor Schauer receivedhis legal training
was the birthplace of the legal process school. Faced with the challenge
of explaining the judicial reaction to the New Deal, and defending the
judicial system against charges that it made politically-motivated
decisions, the legal process school attempted to divorce legal process
from substance, glorifying the notion of legal craft and denying the
appropriateness of substantive values in judicial decision-making."
Professor Schauer's reference to a less outcome-oriented time has some
of this flavor to it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The great strength of Professor Schauer's article is to forcefully
remind us that if we want to understand what judges and justices
actually do, and what motivates them, we must study them empirically.
I am not wholly persuaded by Professor Schauer's suggestion that
scholars investigate the role of personal ambition and self-interest in
judicial decision-making, and focus on the U.S. Supreme Court. To
study the role ofpersonal ambition and self-interest in judicial decision-
making, I suggest the lower federal and state courts provide better sites.
Judges who sit on these courts are sometimes promoted and do
sometimes move on to otherjobs. Further, they may be more willing to
be interviewed by researchers. But even here, I worry that the notion
of reputation is amorphous and unwieldy.
My final point is one with which I am quite sure Professor Schauer
agrees. If we are to study judicial ambition and self-interest, we need to
42. Schauer, supra note 2, at 630.
43. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44. For a critique of the legal process school, see Gary Peller,Neutr /in es in 1he 1950's, 21 U.
MICH.J.L REFORM 561 (1988).
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do so empirically, and we must build on the empirical work that has
gone before. Professor Schauer has pointed us in the right direction.
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